To develop effective environmental policies, we must understand the mechanisms through which the policies affect social and environmental outcomes. Unfortunately, empirical evidence about these mechanisms is limited, and little guidance for quantifying them exists. We develop an approach to quantifying the mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty. We focus on three mechanisms: changes in tourism and recreational services; changes in infrastructure in the form of road networks, health clinics, and schools; and changes in regulating and provisioning ecosystem services and foregone production activities that arise from landuse restrictions. The contributions of ecotourism and other ecosystem services to poverty alleviation in the context of a real environmental program have not yet been empirically estimated. Nearly two-thirds of the poverty reduction associated with the establishment of Costa Rican protected areas is causally attributable to opportunities afforded by tourism. Although protected areas reduced deforestation and increased regrowth, these land cover changes neither reduced nor exacerbated poverty, on average. Protected areas did not, on average, affect our measures of infrastructure and thus did not contribute to poverty reduction through this mechanism. We attribute the remaining poverty reduction to unobserved dimensions of our mechanisms or to other mechanisms. Our study empirically estimates previously unidentified contributions of ecotourism and other ecosystem services to poverty alleviation in the context of a real environmental program. We demonstrate that, with existing data and appropriate empirical methods, conservation scientists and policymakers can begin to elucidate the mechanisms through which ecosystem conservation programs affect human welfare.
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parks | mediator | impact evaluation | quasi-experimental | matching S cholars and practitioners have begun to more carefully assess the causal effects of ecosystem conservation programs on environmental and social outcomes (e.g., land cover and local livelihoods; reviews in refs. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] and how these effects vary spatially (6, 7) . However, we still know very little about why these effects occur or fail to occur (8) .
Consider, for example, a bulwark of ecosystem conservation: the creation of protected area networks, like parks and reserves. Governments often establish these networks on marginal lands in rural areas where poor households reside (9) (10) (11) (12) . The effects of protection on poverty in neighboring communities are thus a subject of much concern and debate (text and references in refs. 12 and 13) . Recent studies have estimated that protected areas reduced poverty in neighboring communities in Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Thailand (12, 14, 15) . These studies, however, do not elucidate the specific mechanisms through which the protected areas reduced poverty.
Understanding the mechanisms through which environmental programs work is crucial for sustainability science and practice. Armed with such knowledge, decision makers can design programs that foster the mechanisms that alleviate poverty and mitigate the mechanisms that exacerbate poverty. The ecosystem conservation literature, however, offers little guidance on how to empirically estimate the impacts of these mechanisms. To show how the causal mechanisms of protected areas (or of any environmental program) can be identified, we use data from Costa Rica and quantify the proportion of Andam et al.'s (12) estimated poverty reduction that can be attributed to changes in infrastructure, tourism services, and other ecosystem services.
Ecosystem services are important in the lives of the rural poor (16, 17) , and some have proposed that there may be strong links between protecting ecosystem services and sustainable development (18) . In an essay on the relationship between ecosystem conservation and the Millennium Development Goals, the authors argue that, " [a] ction is urgently needed to identify and quantify the links between biodiversity and ecosystem services on the one hand, and poverty reduction on the other" (ref. 19 , p. 1502). We agree, but argue that the focus should not be on poverty's links to biodiversity and ecosystem services per se, but rather on poverty's links to programs that aim to maintain or enhance biodiversity and ecosystem services. Although studies have tried to estimate the value of ecosystem services to the poor (for example, references in refs. 17 and 20) , these studies do not measure the impacts of changes in ecosystem services that result from actual policies and programs.
Conservationists cannot induce changes in ecosystem services by magic; they must use policies and programs. There is a difference between the statements "poor people depend on ecosystem services" and "poor people would be better off with a specific conservation program" (ref. 21, p. 1137) . Poor people may indeed derive value from ecosystem services, but a protected Significance Scholars are accumulating evidence about the effects of environmental programs on social outcomes. Quantifying these effects is important, but to design better programs we need to understand how these effects arise. Little is known about the mechanisms through which ecosystem conservation programs affect human welfare. Our study demonstrates that, with existing data and appropriate empirical designs, scientists and policymakers can elucidate these previously unidentified mechanisms. We estimate how Costa Rica's protected area system reduced poverty in neighboring communities. Nearly two-thirds of the impact is causally attributable to opportunities afforded by tourism. The rest is attributable to unobserved mechanisms. Changes in infrastructure or land cover contributed little, on average, to poverty reduction.
area program, for example, may affect the poor very differently than a payment for environmental services program would affect them. The effects may differ because the programs operate through different mechanisms or affect the same mechanisms to different degrees. Our study seeks to measure the poverty impacts of changes in ecosystem services that result from an actual conservation program.
Our study also measures the contribution to poverty alleviation from protected area-based ecotourism at a national scale. In December 2010, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution stating that "ecotourism can . . . contribute to the fight against poverty, the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development." [Resolution 65/173, entitled "Promotion of ecotourism for poverty eradication and environment protection" (http://www.un. org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/173).] However, the hypothesis that nature-based tourism can benefit the rural poor has been vigorously debated (9, 10, (22) (23) (24) (25) , and the empirical evidence for or against it is weak. In one review, the authors note that "there is no way to know the extent of changes in poverty . . . that can be attributed to a specific ecotourism project because none of the studies provided baseline measures or established specific causal mechanisms to relate the implemented program with observed outcomes" (ref. 8, p. 21) . Our study does both.
Mechanisms
Andam et al. (12) estimate that the establishment of protected areas before 1980 in Costa Rica caused a 16% reduction in poverty in neighboring census tracts by the year 2000 (12) . We decompose this impact into its constituent mechanism effects; i.e., we clarify the causal pathways through which this reduction in poverty was achieved. We consider three of the most widely hypothesized mechanisms.
Tourism and Recreational Services. The provision of tourism and recreational services is a widely cited mechanism through which protected areas could affect the poor (9, 10, (22) (23) (24) 26 ). The empirical evidence for or against ecotourism's poverty-reducing powers typically comprises selective accounting of jobs lost and gained, expenditures made, or local prices changed. Such accounting, however, cannot hope to capture the myriad direct and indirect channels through which ecotourism can affect poverty (it will also often capture the effects of other mechanisms). No study has tried to estimate the causal effect on poverty in the communities around protected areas from the additional tourism caused by protection. Costa Rica's stable government, rich biodiversity, and protected area system make the country a popular destination for ecotourists (27) . Approximately half of its international tourists visit a protected area (28). Indirect evidence for the potential poverty-reducing effects from Costa Rican ecotourism comes from three sources. First, a review of ecosystem service valuation studies found that over half of the well-designed tourism and recreational service studies were from Costa Rica (2) . Each study estimated substantial economic value, albeit not directly for the poor. A second study estimates that reductions in poverty from the establishment of protected areas were largest at intermediate distances from cities, where one finds the national parks that receive the most tourists (6) . A third study estimates that workers near park entrances work in higher-paid, nonagricultural activities than workers in similar communities farther from park entrances (29). Despite these suggestive results, other studies have questioned whether ecotourism in Costa Rica has much local development benefit (30).
We cannot observe changes in tourism services directly and instead must identify a strong correlate of them. Our correlate is the establishment of a formal entrance for the protected area. In other words, we assume that poverty-relevant increases in tourism activity arise only after the establishment of a formal entrance through which tourists can pass. We believe this assumption is reasonable because an estimated 96% of visitors to protected areas in 2007 visited a protected area with a formal entrance (Table S1 ) (see SI Text for an explanation of why recent visitation data cannot be used).
Other Ecosystem Services. By restricting land cover change, protected areas may maintain or enhance other ecosystem services, such as pollination or hydrological services (31, 32), which are important in the lives of the rural poor (16, 17, 19) . However, these same restrictions can also have detrimental effects on the poor. For example, they stop profitable agricultural and forestry activities and enable wildlife-related crop damage and depredation of livestock (20, 33) .
We cannot observe the individual effects, salutary or detrimental, that arise from forest use restrictions. Instead we estimate the net effect on poverty from the changes in forest cover caused by protection between 1960 and 1986. This net effect is policy relevant: It matters little to the poor if they benefit from some changes in ecosystem services caused by restrictions on forest use if the net effect of the restrictions is an increase in poverty. [Although we believe that future studies should attempt to decompose this mechanism into its constituent mechanisms, doing so may be difficult if protected areas' effects on the constituent mechanisms are highly correlated (e.g., when one observes large impacts on hydrological services, one also observes large impacts on pollination services and foregone agricultural production).]
Infrastructure. Protected areas can affect poverty through mechanisms other than changes in ecosystem services. The most plausible mechanism is changes in infrastructure. Infrastructure may be enhanced or blocked by the establishment of protected areas. For example, protected area rules may limit road development in an area or, because of anticipated needs by law enforcement or tourists, they may encourage road development. Road networks are important because they greatly affect the costs of inputs, outputs, and consumption goods for the rural poor (34). They are also a good indicator of the broader level of infrastructure development. [Based on the World Bank's 2009 World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator), the correlations between paved road networks (percentage of country) and access of rural populations to improved water sources (percentage of population), access to improved sanitation services (percentage of population), access to mobile phones (subscriptions per 100 people), and access to electricity (percentage of population) are 0.67, 0.72, 0.53, and 0.68, respectively.] We use changes in roadless volume (35) between 1969 and 1991 to capture the impact of protected areas on road infrastructure. Higher values of roadless volume imply a smaller road network within a given area (i.e., less infrastructure).
Our three mechanism variables do not capture all possible mechanisms or even all dimensions of our three hypothesized mechanisms. Roads could, for example, be improved through improved surfacing, which may or may not be strongly correlated with roadless volume. Levels of ecosystem services, to cite another example, are affected by more than just changes in forest cover, and tourism and recreational opportunities are surely not completely captured by the presence of a park entrance. We do not, however, need an exhaustive set of mechanism variables. Our design, which is described in greater detail in the next section, decomposes the total treatment effect into the three mechanism effects and the effect of unidentified mechanisms. This latter effect includes effects from other mechanisms and from dimensions of our three mechanisms that are not captured by changes in park entrances, forest cover, or roadless volume.
Study Design
To measure poverty, Andam et al. (12) create an asset-based poverty index from the 1973 and 2000 Costa Rican censuses. To measure the effect of protected areas on this index, they use the quasi-experimental design depicted in the directed acyclic graph (DAG) (36) in Fig. 1A . The black arrow connecting protection to poverty, labeled "average treatment effect on the treated ðATTÞ," represents the causal effect of protected areas (treatment) on people living around protected areas (the treated). Estimating the ATT is made difficult by confounding variables: factors that affect where protection is assigned and that also affect poverty (e.g., low agricultural productivity). These confounding variables can mask or mimic the effects of protection on poverty. By controlling for, or blocking, the effects of these confounding variables (represented by the red broken single-headed arrows in Fig. 1A) , one can identify the causal effect of protection on poverty. Andam et al. (12) show that failure to control for confounding variables leads to dramatically different conclusions about protection's effects on poverty.
Mechanisms can be viewed as intermediate outcomes in a causal pathway: A mechanism is an outcome that, once affected by the treatment, affects the final outcome of interest. The DAG in Fig. 1B depicts this refinement of the Andam et al. (12) causal pathway (Fig. 1A) . Each pathway that links protection to poverty through one of the mechanisms represents a mechanism average treatment effect on the treated ðMATTÞ. (We adapt the ideas and terminology from ref. 37 to develop these concepts.) For instance, the tourism MATT is the proportion of the total impact of protected areas on poverty (the ATT) that comes from the change in tourism induced by protection (the top pathway in Fig.  1B : Protection → Tourism → Poverty). The MATT can be viewed as the difference between the total effect of protection on poverty and the effect of protection on poverty when the mechanism is absent. To further clarify the MATT concept, we introduce the following thought experiment that describes an experimental design that would allow one to estimate the mechanism effect from changes in tourism (an experiment that would be impossible to run in practice). The design comprises two experiments that are run sequentially. In the first experiment, protection is randomly assigned to areas from a pool of eligible candidate forests, after which the average impact of protection on poverty in neighboring census tracts is estimated. The second experiment starts with a clean slate and assigns protection to the same areas. In this second experiment, however, the effect of protection on tourism is blocked; i.e., tourism is allowed only to the extent that it would exist if there were no protected area. The average poverty in protected census tracts includes all of the effects of protection except those that arise from changes in tourism. The difference in the average poverty within protected census tracts in the first and second experiments is the tourism MATT.
One cannot, of course, run such experiments. To estimate the MATTs using nonexperimental data, one must answer the following question: What level of poverty would have been observed in protected census tracts had the census tracts been exposed to protection, but had protection not affected the mechanisms? The DAG in Fig.1B illustrates that, in principle, this estimation can be carried out in a two-step process.
First, one estimates the causal effect of protection on the mechanisms (Protection → Mechanism). Second, one estimates how the change in the mechanisms due to protection affects poverty (Mechanism → Poverty). [Mechanisms are, by definition, affected by the cause (e.g., protected status). Thus, simply controlling for mechanisms within, for example, a single-equation regression framework will generally make the regression estimator biased (38).] Fig. 1B also illustrates the obstacles in this two-stage process. First, one must control for (break the link between) confounding variables that jointly affect the establishment of protected areas, the mechanisms and poverty. Second, one must model the effect of protection on poverty in the absence of the mechanisms. To address these two issues, we extend the matching design of Andam et al. (12) , using a two-stage framework developed by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (37). This design yields an estimate of the counterfactual poverty in each protected census tract, had protection not affected the mechanisms; in other words, had the mechanisms in the protected tracts taken on the values observed in their matched unprotected tracts, holding all other relevant covariates constant. For each mechanism, the MATT is the difference between the average poverty level in the protected census tracts and the average counterfactual poverty level with the mechanism blocked. We conduct several robustness checks and explore how violations of our underlying assumptions can affect our results. See Materials and Methods and SI Text for full exposition of methods, including details on the controls for confounding variables.
If we were able to account for, and measure, all of the mechanisms through which protection affects poverty, the sum of all of the MATTs would equal the ATT. As noted in the Mechanisms section, however, our set of mechanisms is not exhaustive. The proportion of the total ATT that stems from mechanisms other than the ones we measure is defined as the net average treatment effect on the treated ðNATTÞ. See SI Text for a formal exposition of MATT and NATT.
Results
Andam et al. (12) estimate that poverty indexes were, on average, 2.39 points lower in protected census tracts than they would have been in the absence of protection (P < 0.01). This reduction is equivalent to 0.27 SD of the poverty distribution among the matched unprotected tracts (i.e., effect size = 0.27). Fig. 2 summarizes how much of this ATT is accounted for by each of our mechanisms.
The tourism and recreational service mechanism has the largest MATT (P < 0.01; Materials and Methods). It thus accounts for the greatest proportion of the total poverty reduction that comes from the establishment of protected areas. Were the mechanism blocked, the estimated poverty reduction would have been about 70% smaller.
Protection induced more forest cover than would have been present in the absence of protection. The estimated MATT, however, is small, positive (the mechanism increases poverty), and not statistically different from zero (P > 0.2). Thus, we find no evidence that restricting land cover change in protected forests either reduced or exacerbated poverty around protected areas, on average.
Although the development of road networks in protected census tracts reduces poverty (Table S2) , the establishment of protected areas did not have a substantial impact on the development of road networks (roadless volume decreased by 16%). Thus, the estimated MATT on poverty is small (3% of the ATT) and not statistically different from zero (P > 0.5).
Unidentified mechanisms account for about one-third of the estimated poverty reduction. These unidentified mechanisms may include mechanisms other than the three we identified or include pathways not captured by our mechanism proxies (e.g., tourism opportunities unaffected by the presence or absence of a park entrance).
Robustness Checks and Rival Explanations. We explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in methodology and then consider potential hidden bias in our estimators (i.e., unobserved confounding variables in Fig. 1B) . First, we rerun all of the analyses using 1973 census tract boundaries, instead of the 2000 boundaries. The estimates are nearly identical; given there are fewer units, the precision of the estimates is lower (Table S3 ). Second, we reestimate all mechanism effects, using a more traditional system of structural equations (39, 40), which indirectly accounts for counterfactual outcomes under certain assumptions (SI Text). The estimated mechanism effects are similar: Tourism accounts for more than half of the poverty reduction and the other two mechanisms account for little of it (Table S4 ). One important difference in this alternative analysis is that the modest poverty exacerbation effect of the change in forest cover in Fig. 2 is statistically significant. Third, we use an alternative technique to recover the tourism MATT through the estimation of a local NATT (37). This approach requires fewer assumptions, but to recover the MATT, it assumes that the NATT is constant across protected tracts (i.e., no heterogeneity in responses to nontourism mechanisms). The MATT estimate is larger, but qualitatively similar, at −2.14 (see SI Text, Local NATT for details). Fourth, rather than use roadless volume as a proxy for changes in infrastructure, we use the number of health clinics and schools (Table S5 ). The estimated MATTs are smaller than the estimate using roadless volume and not statistically different from zero (P > 0.5).
Another concern is that our mechanisms may not be isolated from each other. In other words, they may affect each other and thus parts of one mechanism effect could be embedded in the estimate of another. If true, however, we would expect that there would be strong correlations among our mechanism variables. We would also expect a large difference, due to multicollinearity, between estimated MATTs when we estimate them jointly (as in Fig. 2) vs. separately. In contrast, the correlations among our mechanism variables are relatively low (Table S6 ) and the estimated MATTs are similar whether estimated jointly or separately (Table S2) .
To consider the potential that our results arise from hidden sources of bias, we identify the most serious potential sources of bias and discuss their likely effects on our estimators. For the tourism mechanism, the biggest threat comes from unobserved factors that are positively correlated with park entrance placement and negatively correlated with poverty (i.e., negative selection bias in the second stage of our two-stage approach). For example, the government may have systematically protected locations with high expected future economic development, using characteristics that were unobservable to us. Such targeting would bias our estimator toward finding a poverty-alleviating effect from tourism. For the infrastructure mechanism, the main threat comes from factors that are positively correlated with where protection is assigned and negatively correlated with infrastructure development (i.e., negative selection bias in the first stage of our twostage approach). For example, unobservable local political power may make infrastructure development more likely and the nearby establishment of a protected area less likely. Such power would bias our estimator toward finding no poverty-alleviating effect from infrastructure development. For the land cover mechanism, the main threat comes from factors that are positively correlated with forest cover change and poverty (i.e., the second stage). For example, protection may be most effective at inducing additional forest cover in areas that are politically the least powerful and thus less likely to economically develop. Such a phenomenon would bias our estimator toward positive numbers.
These three rival explanations require the presence of unobservable sources of heterogeneity in economic development potential and local political power that are only weakly correlated with our control variables. Our control variables comprise the main factors that affect agriculture, and thus economic growth, in rural areas. Therefore, although we cannot prove the absence of important unobservable sources of heterogeneity, we do not know from where they could arise. Moreover, if the first and third rival explanations were both true, an unusual pattern of hidden bias would have to exist: One mechanism (tourism increase) is more likely in communities that have higher expected potential poverty reduction in the absence of the mechanism, whereas the other mechanism (forest cover increase) is more likely in exactly the opposite type of communities. Furthermore, to reverse our conclusion about the effect of changes in forest cover and instead conclude that the increase in forest cover induced by protection contributed to a modest proportion (10%) of the reduction in poverty, the coefficient in our second-stage estimation procedure (i.e., relationship between changes in forest cover and poverty) would have to change by more than 9 SDs. We find such a degree of hidden bias implausible. These conclusions are supported by an alternative approach to examining the sensitivity of our results developed for systems of structural equations (40) ( Table S4) .
[Another rival explanation is that changes in the mechanisms led to emigration of the poor or immigration of wealthier households, thereby mimicking a reduction in poverty. Andam Fig. 2 . Estimated mechanism average treatment effects on the treated ðMATT Þ and net average treatment effect on the treated ðNATTÞ for Costa Rica's protected area network. Depicted are (1) the qualitative impact of protection on each of the mechanisms, (2) the estimated causal impact of protection on each of the mechanisms, (3) the estimated impact on poverty due to a 1-unit change in the value of each mechanism (marginal effect), (4) the estimated MATT for each mechanism, and (5) the amount of the original ATT for which our mechanisms do not account (the NATT). See Table  S2 for full results, including SEs.
Discussion
The Durban Accord at the Fifth World Parks Congress proclaimed that the establishment of protected areas should strive to reduce, and in no way exacerbate, poverty. To achieve this goal, the conservation community needs a better understanding of the mechanisms through which protected areas affect poverty. Our analysis suggests that nearly two-thirds of the poverty reduction associated with the establishment of Costa Rican protected areas is causally attributable to tourism. Changes in infrastructure and changes in forest cover account for little or none of the estimated poverty reduction. The mechanism effect of infrastructure is small because, although infrastructure development reduces poverty, protected areas had little effect on infrastructure development. In contrast, protected areas did increase forest cover, but this change had no detectable average effect on poverty.
As noted in Mechanisms, protected areas' effects on forest cover may have both salutary and detrimental effects on the rural poor. The DAG in Fig. 3 depicts these elaborated causal pathways. As reported in other studies (12, 41) , the change in forest cover caused by protected areas in Costa Rica comes from both reduced deforestation and increased forest regrowth. These land cover changes have three potential mechanism effects on poverty. First, they can increase salutary regulating and provisioning ecosystem services, which in turn reduce poverty. Second, they can increase detrimental ecosystem services (or reduce salutary services), which in turn increase poverty. Third, they can decrease production/extraction activities and thereby increase poverty. We estimated only the net effect of these three potential effects and thus cannot discriminate between two potential inferences: (i) On average, the three mechanisms have no effect on the poor (all three mechanism effects are zero) or (ii) on average, the salutary and detrimental effects are nonzero, but are of opposite sign and approximately equal, thus canceling each other out.
Future studies that have precise measures of ecosystem service flows and foregone productive activities may be able to discriminate between these rival explanations. However, if one were willing to make the plausible assumption that restrictions on forest use had some negative effects on the poor, then one could infer that the salutary effects from regulating and provisioning ecosystem services provide a countervailing weight against these negative effects (i.e., accept inference ii above).
About one-third of the estimated reduction in poverty comes from unidentified mechanisms, which may include mechanisms other than the three we identified (e.g., changes in social capital) or dimensions of our mechanisms not captured by our proxies (e.g., changes in ecosystem services that are weakly correlated with changes in forest cover). To further decompose the total effect of protection in Costa Rica and elsewhere, future studies should seek richer measures of mechanisms. For example, through which mechanisms precisely did tourism reduce poverty in Costa Rica? Unlike other countries (e.g., Madagascar), Costa Rica has no system of revenue sharing with local communities. Thus, tourism likely reduced poverty in Costa Rica through market channels.
Costa Rica is a country renowned for its public and private ecotourism investments (42). Thus, one should be cautious about extrapolating our results to other countries. Furthermore, we do not claim that our study is the last word on estimating causal mechanism effects, for protected areas or any other conservation initiative. To truly understand the mechanisms through which ecosystem conservation policies affect poverty, we need to build the evidence base on a policy-by-policy and country-by-country (or region-by-region) basis. To generate this evidence, interdisciplinary teams of scientists need to collect the right data and analyze them within designs that help isolate mechanism effects.
Despite its limitations, our study creates a unique path of inquiry that can yield policy-relevant evidence. For example, the debate about the role of ecotourism in poverty alleviation is unresolved. We believe our study highlights unique avenues for tourism research through the use of strong empirical designs aimed at identifying the causal effects of policy-supported tourism.
Ultimately, the conservation science community wants fully elaborated theories and structural empirical models. With these theories and models, we can better understand the multiple causes of environmental and social outcomes and the trade-offs among different policies. At this time, however, we are far from realizing this goal. As noted in a previous study (4), our best hope in the short term is to develop better theory and empirical evidence about the effects of individual causes (e.g., protected areas, incentives, and decentralization), the heterogeneity of these effects (including interactions with other causes), and the mechanisms through which these effects are realized. With this new theory and evidence, scientists, policymakers, and practitioners can design better policies for achieving environmental and social goals. Treatment. To determine whether a census tract is considered protected for the analyses, a layer containing all protected areas established before 1980 is overlaid with the census tracts. During the study period, protected areas were in International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) categories Ia, I, II, IV, and VI. As in ref. 12 , a census tract is considered protected if at least 10% of its area is occupied by protected land of any IUCN category. A 10% threshold was chosen because protecting 10% of the world's ecosystems was the goal of the Fourth World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas (12) . Conversely, any census tract that contains less than 1% protected land is considered unprotected. Of the 17,239 census tracts, 483 are protected (treated) before 1980 and 16,249 are potential counterfactual observations. To avoid bias in the analyses, 507 tracts with protection between 1% and 10% are dropped from the analysis. . Elaborated causal pathway for the land cover mechanism average treatment effect on the treated ðMATT Þ. For example, in our study, Protection → Forest Cover → Salutary Ecosystem Services → Poverty describes the pathway in which protection causes an increase in forest cover, which leads to an increase in salutary ecosystem services, which then reduces poverty. We are unable to quantify the mechanisms that lie between forest cover and poverty; therefore our estimated MATT for changes in forest cover captures all these potential pathways.
Land Cover Mechanism. Using the forest cover layers from ref. 44, we measure the percentage of forest cover within each census tract in 1960 and 1986 (see Table S7 for baseline and mechanism measurements of forest cover).
Infrastructure Mechanism. We quantify infrastructure development using change in roadless volume between 1969 and 1991. Roadless volume is the sum of the product of area and distance to the nearest road for every 1-ha parcel within the census tract and is calculated as in ref. 12 (Table S7) .
Two-Stage Estimation Procedure. The confounders in Fig. 1B that we seek to control are the same variables postulated to jointly affect protection and poverty in previous studies (6, 12, 45) : baseline poverty, forest area, agricultural productivity classes, roadless volume, and distance to markets (see SI Text for definitions and sources and Table S7 for descriptive statistics). To estimate counterfactual poverty and mechanism values, we match census tracts on these characteristics (i.e., find unprotected census tracts that are observably similar to protected tracts). In the first stage, we select the matching algorithm that achieves the best covariate balance for our sample: one-to-one Mahalanobis nearest-neighbor covariate matching with a bias-adjustment procedure (46) for imperfect matching in finite samples (see SI Text for details; Table S8 has covariate balance results). The difference in poverty between the matched protected and unprotected tracts yields the ATT of Andam et al. (12) . The matched unprotected units also provide an estimate of counterfactual mechanism values for protected units (i.e., the value of the mechanism in the absence of protection). In the second stage, we estimate the counterfactual poverty for protected census tracts had protection not impacted the mechanism. We use a regression technique suggested by ref. 37, which is similar to the regression bias-adjustment techniques of refs. 46 and 47. First, the effects of the mechanisms on poverty are estimated in a regression framework. The estimated regression coefficients capture the influence of the mechanisms, and of the observable covariates used in the first stage, on poverty in the protected census tracts (Tables S2, S3 , and S9 Table S7 . (2000) and as a control covariate (1973). The index is created using a principal components analysis that measures the relative influence of variables believed to affect poverty on a latent outcome (poverty). Using the estimated influences of each variable, and the observed values of the variables in each census tract, we estimate the relative poverty by census tract.
The variables used in the poverty index estimation are as follows (* indicates a percentage): men in total population*, families who cook with coal or wood*, families without washing machine*, families without refrigerator*, people who are used and get a salary as job remuneration*, illiterate population aged 12 or more*, household dwellings without connection to private or public water system*, household dwellings without sewers*, household dwellings without electricity*, household dwellings without telephone*, dwellings with earth floor*, dwellings in bad condition*, dwellings without bathroom*, dwellings without access to hot water*, dependency ratio, average number of occupants per bedroom, and average years of education per adult.
Forest Cover. We use changes in forest cover between 1960 and 1986 as our proxy to capture ecosystem services other than tourism. These data come from Andam et al. (2) and are measured at a 3-ha resolution. Forest cover (or lack thereof) on each 3-ha parcel is defined by an 80% threshold. In other words, if a parcel contains at least 80% canopy cover in a given time period, then it is considered forested. However, if canopy cover is less than 80%, the parcel is not considered forested.
Tourism Mechanism. Without a direct measure of tourism services we choose the presence of a park entrance as a proxy/correlate. The GIS data on park entrances were provided by Robalino and Villalobos-Fiatt (5). Based on knowledge of the protected area system, we add Cabo Blanco and Guayabo national parks to the list of protected areas with an entrance. The addition of these two protected areas increases the number of census tracts affected by a protected area with an entrance from 205 to 227. However, the estimated mechanism average treatment effect on the treated (MATT) is not affected significantly by this addition (MATT = − 1:4 without inclusion).
There are incomplete tourism visitation data for the last 10 y, but, for five reasons, we do not believe they can be used to estimate mechanism effects: (i) We have no baseline tourism for any of the parks and before 2000 the data are patchy (e.g., only four parks have data from the 1980s and none have data from 1970s); (ii) even in the last 10 y, there are some years with zero reported tourists, including for large protected areas that regularly receive tens of thousands of tourists annually; (iii) even if we had complete data, it is not clear which single year should be used or whether some average over the years would be better; (iv) many parks without entrances are not reported at all and thus may not be truly zeros; and (v) there is no reason to believe there is a oneto-one mapping between the raw number of tourists and poverty reduction (i.e., the kind of tourists and tourism matters and our data on the origin and activities of the tourists are even worse than raw numbers; in other words, estimating the marginal effect of adding one more tourist is not theoretically justified).
Migration. As noted by Andam et al. (1) , one of the potential rival explanations for the finding that protected areas reduced poverty is migration. The authors are concerned that the emigration, from protected census tracts to unprotected census tracts, of individuals most adversely affected by protection could lead to the false conclusion that protected areas were beneficial to surrounding populations. However, the authors find no statistical evidence that protection had an impact on population density. Thus, if poor people were leaving protected census tracts they must have been replaced by wealthier immigrants [for full results see Andam et al. (1)].
Despite the lack of evidence that migration is driving the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), there may be patterns of migration systematically linked to our mechanisms that could be accounting for our estimated MATTs (and therefore the ATT). Perhaps the most plausible scenario relates to the opportunities from tourism afforded by protected areas. (We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.) If protected areas spur immigration of individuals with higher propensities to gain from the ecotourism industry, then the observed poverty effects might not be accruing to the existing community members. Therefore, the assertion that protected areas made the poor better off would be an inaccurate interpretation of the results. If tourism opportunities led to significant in-migration of those poised to benefit from the opportunities, then we would expect to see differentially greater population densities in census tracts that were affected by a park entrance. However, when we match census tracts that were affected by a park entrance to unprotected census tracts, we find no statistical difference in population densities (ATT = 0:015, P > 0:8). Therefore, only a more complex pattern of migration, where immigration of wealthier individuals was offset by emigration of poor individuals, could account for the observed poverty impacts in both the ATT and the MATT.
Mechanism Theory and Concepts
Setup. In the study from which we draw our data (1), the estimand of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT: the effect of protection on poverty in the census tracts that were protected. Estimation of the ATT is akin to asking the question, "What would outcomes for protected census tracts have been had they not been protected?" Thus, we estimate the MATT. To estimate the causal mechanisms through which protected areas have affected poverty, we use an augmented potential outcomes framework [we follow the framework and much of the notation of Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6)]. The ATT can be defined as
where Y i ð1Þ and Y i ð0Þ are the potential outcomes for each unit i ∈ N (e.g., census tracts) under treatment ðT = 1Þ and control conditions ðT = 0Þ, respectively. In words, the ATT estimates the difference between observed outcomes, for treated units, and counterfactual outcomes (what the outcome would have been for those treated units, had they not been treated). The fact that counterfactual outcomes [Y i ð0Þ jT = 1 in this case] are unobservable requires one to invoke the following assumption:
E½Y i ð0Þ jX i ; T i = 1 = E½Y i ð0Þ jX i ; T i = 0; which states that, on average, the observed outcomes of untreated units represent the counterfactual outcomes for treated units (i.e., had the treated units not been treated) with similar values of X. Principal strata. Identification of posttreatment mechanism effects requires additional concepts and assumptions. Suppose S is a posttreatment mechanism that is measured at an intermediate period between administration of treatment and measurement of outcome. (Note that the three mechanisms of interest are denoted formally as S j , where j = 1; 2; 3. For ease of exposition throughout the majority of this discussion, the subscript is omitted.) Because, by definition, S is affected by treatment, it is not unconditionally independent of treatment (this is true under random assignment of treatment as well) and thus must be handled in a manner similar to the outcome of interest (Y). Therefore, as with Y, S has two potential outcomes S i ð1Þ and S i ð0Þ for each i, depending on assignment to treatment or control, respectively. This simply states that because mechanisms are affected by treatment, with the exception of some special cases, the mechanism outcome for each unit is dependent on the administered treatment. The implications, within the potential outcomes framework, are that four potential outcomes must now be considered for each unit ðY i ð1Þ; Y i ð0Þ; S i ð1Þ; S i ð0ÞÞ.
There are now four compound potential outcomes of interest for each i: (i) Y i ð1; S i ð1ÞÞ, the outcome when the unit is exposed to the treatment and the mechanism is affected by the treatment, which represents the total effect of treatment and is equivalent to Y i ð1Þ in the traditional potential outcomes framework; (ii) Y i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞ, the outcome when the unit is exposed to the treatment but the mechanism is not affected by the treatment (in other words, the outcome the unit would experience were we to expose it to the treatment but hold the value of the mechanism at its no-treatment value; in the language of Flores and Flores-Lagunes, the mechanism is "blocked"); (iii) Y i ð0; S i ð0ÞÞ, the outcome when the unit is not exposed to the treatment and the mechanism is not affected, which is equivalent to Y i ð0Þ in the traditional potential outcomes framework (i.e., posttreatment mechanism is not affected in absence of treatment); and (iv) Y i ð0; S i ð1ÞÞ, the outcome when the unit is not exposed to the treatment but the mechanism is affected as it would be if the unit were treated. In general, only Y i ð1; S i ð1ÞÞ and Y i ð0; S i ð0ÞÞ are observed in practice, leaving Y i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞ and Y i ð0; S i ð1ÞÞ as counterfactuals that require estimation.
To help conceptualize the joint potential outcomes and identify the causal mechanism effect, we follow Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6) by using the principal strata framework developed by Frangakis and Rubin (7) [also Rubin (8) and Mealli and Rubin (9)]. Defining a principal stratum is similar to the concept of matching units (or groups of units) based on similar potential outcomes in a standard quasi-experimental setting. Two units from different treatments (e.g., protected and unprotected) share a principal stratum if they share potential mechanism outcomes [formally a principal stratum is defined where fSð0Þ = s 0 ; Sð1Þ = s 1 g].
Our primary estimand, the MATT, requires that we estimate outcomes for treated units, had the mechanism been blocked (not affected the outcome). To find suitable counterfactual mechanism values for treated units (i.e., to identify units from disparate treatments but similar principal strata) we need the assumption of conditional mechanism isolation:
E½S i ð0Þ jX i ; T i = 1 = E½S i ð0Þ jX i ; T i = 0:
In other words, we assume that, conditional on X, protection is not assigned based on expectations that tourism, infrastructure, or ecosystem services will be different under treatment and control conditions.
If covariates X jointly determine selection into treatment, outcomes, and mechanism outcomes, then Assumptions 1 and 2 allow for the identification of mechanism effects. Upon cursory examination, this may seem untenable. However, when one considers that the primary purpose of X is to control for the nonrandom process of selection into treatment and that treatment directly affects mechanisms, these sequential assumptions seem more reasonable.
Estimands. Our estimands follow directly from the framework for mechanism average treatment effects ðMATEÞ and net average treatment effects ðNATEÞ developed by Flores and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6) . A principal stratum is defined as {Sð0Þ = s 0 , Sð1Þ = s 1 }, which states that units located within a common principal stratum would have similar mechanism outcomes [s 0 had they been in the control group ðSð0ÞÞ or s 1 had they been treated ðSð1ÞÞ, independent of actual treatment received]. The MATT can be written MATT = EfE½Y i ð1; S i ð1ÞÞ − Y i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞ jS i ð0Þ = s 0 ; S i ð1Þ = s 1 ; X i = x; T i = 1g:
[S2]
To estimate the MATT one must ask, "What would outcomes for the treated have been, had they remained treated but had treatment not affected the mechanism?" Estimation of the MATT answers this question by eliminating all sources of variation in the outcome other than that which is due to a change in the mechanism (via blocking the effect of the mechanism on the outcome in the second term of [S2]). A similar estimand of interest is the net average treatment effect on the treated ðNATTÞ, which isolates the effect on outcomes due to a change in treatment, holding S at untreated levels. An advantage of the MATT and the NATT is that they decompose the ATT such that ATT = MATT +
NATT. This decomposition states that the average treatment effect on the treated is equal to the proportion of the of treatment effect that is due to a change in the mechanism (induced by treatment), the MATT, and the proportion that is due to other mechanisms or solely to the effect of treatment, the NATT (Fig.  1B) . Therefore, once either the MATT or NATT is estimated, the complementary estimate falls out of the difference with the ATT.
[Satisfaction of Assumption 2 is necessary for this identity to hold. Morgan and Winship (10) outline conditions under which T → Y can be estimated using a set of mechanisms (e.g., the set of mechanisms is exhaustive and isolated). However, one can measure the partial effect of T → Y using a nonexhaustive set of mechanisms, S (i.e., S → Y ), which leads to an estimate of MATT. In conjunction with Assumption 1, under which unbiased estimates of the ATT can be estimated, the remaining difference between MATT and ATT can be attributed to the mechanisms not included in S. The full decomposition can be written as ATT = E½Y ð1; Sð1ÞÞ − Y ð1; Sð0ÞÞ jT = 1 + E½Y ð1; Sð0ÞÞ − Y ð0; Sð0ÞÞ jT = 1, given principal strata fSð0Þ = s 0 ; Sð1Þ = (Fig. 1B) . Postmatching, we follow methods suggested by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6). We use mechanism data from the matched control units, and a simple assumption about the way in which mechanisms affect outcomes within principal strata, to impute outcomes for treated units had treatment not affected the mechanism variables: the counterfactual of interest.
First Stage: Matching. We use one-to-one Mahalanobis covariate matching with replacement and postmatch bias adjustment (11, 12) to match control units to treated units. This approach serves two purposes. First, it provides an estimate of the ATT, for comparison with the MATT and NATT, which offers comparability to previous studies from Costa Rica (1, 13, 14) . Second, it provides a set of matched controls that, by Assumptions 1 and 2, are within the same principal strata as the treated units to which they are matched. The latter purpose implies that the mechanism outcomes of the matched controls can be assumed to be the value that would have been observed by their treated counterparts, had treatment not affected the mechanisms. See Table S7 for a description of the covariates used for matching [also see Andam et al. (1) for complete details].
Second Stage: Estimate the Influence of Mechanisms. Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6) suggest using a form of regression adjustment to impute outcomes for treated units had treatment not affected mechanisms. The necessary assumption for this approach (in addition to Assumptions 1 and 2) is that the mechanism has a similar effect on potential outcomes Y i ð1; S i ð1ÞÞ and Y i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞ; i.e., their conditional expectation functions share the same functional form (6) . :
[S5]
Assumption 3 implies that the marginal effect of a change in the mechanism outcome has the same effect, on average, on units for whom exposure to treatment affects the mechanism as it does on units for whom exposure to treatment does not affect the mechanism.
In :
[S6]
Similarly, the empirical form of the NATT becomes We again emphasize the intuition behind the counterfactual of interest, which can be used in the estimation of both the MATT and NATT. The regression imputation methods presented in [S4] and [S5] allow us to address the question, "What would the outcomes for treated units have been had their respective covariates ðX obs i jT = 1Þ and influences of these covariates on outcomes ðb 1 Þ remained the same, but their mechanism had taken on the values that would have been observed had they not been treated ðSð0ÞjT = 1Þ?" We note that the difference between S obs i ð1Þ jT = 1 (the observed mechanism value of treated units) andŜ i ð0Þ jT = 1 (the estimated counterfactual values of treated units, had they not been treated) represents the unit-level causal effect of treatment on mechanism outcomes ðT → SÞ.
Bias-Adjusted Mechanism Outcomes. Abadie and Imbens (12) and Abadie et al. (11) suggest the use of postmatch regression bias adjustments in the estimation of the ATT to control for bias that remains from imperfect matching in finite samples. We apply a similar method in the estimation of our counterfactual mechanism outcomes.
Postmatch bias adjustment in estimation of the ATT is conducted by first running a regression of outcomes on matching covariates Y T=0 = X T=0 β C + e. This regression estimates the impact ðβ C Þ of the matching covariates on outcomes for the matched control sample. To impute the ATT counterfactual of interest, β C is combined with the covariates from the treated units X T=1 to estimateŶ BA = X T=1 β C : what treated unit outcomes would have been had their matching covariates had the same influence on outcomes as the control units. Note that if matching produces perfect balance across treated and matched control units, then a counterfactual based on the observed values of the matched control outcomes ðY i:T=0 Þ will be identical to those estimated from the regression bias adjustment procedure ðŶ i:BA Þ.
The estimation of our counterfactual of interest in [S6] is a function of both b 1 from [S4] andŜ i ð0Þ jT = 1. By Assumption 2, we can use the mechanism outcomes of the matched controls as the counterfactual for treated units. However, if imbalance in the baseline mechanism covariates remains after matching, we may be concerned that counterfactual mechanism values will be biased. [If mechanism outcomes are state dependent, then imbalance is a concern. For instance, if, after matching, unprotected tracts have lower baseline roadless volume, on average, than protected tracts, change in roadless volume may be less (in absolute terms) in unprotected tracts, simply because they started with larger road networks.] We therefore estimate our counterfactual mechanism values ½Ŝ i ð0Þ jT = 1 = S obs i:T=0 +μ 0 ðX i:T=1 Þ −μ 0 ðX i:T=0 Þ;
[S8]
whereμ 0 represents the predicted values obtained from combining the coefficients from a control group regression of mechanism outcomes on covariates with the respective treated ðμ 0 ðX i:T=1 ÞÞ or control group ðμ 0 ðX i:T=0 ÞÞ covariates. This procedure estimates the influence of baseline covariates on mechanism outcomes for control units and uses these estimated values to impute what the mechanism outcomes would have been had the control units been treated.
SEs. To calculate the precision of our MATT estimates we base our SE estimator on the heteroskedasticity robust matchingbased estimator suggested by Abadie and Imbens (12) . (A function that estimates the SEs outlined in this section was programmed in R 2.15.1 and is available from the authors upon request.) Our estimator is calculated in two stages to allow for heteroskedastic variances within and across treatment arms. The variance for control units is calculated using a within-treatment arm matching estimator. The Mahalanobis weighting matrix from the original matching process (used to create the matched sample) is used to find the nearest within-treatment arm (unprotected) neighbor to estimate unit-level variances,
where Y l represents the outcome of the nearest neighbor to unit i. The treatment-level variance is then calculated aŝ
where λ i = #C i =N T=0 , and #C i is the number of times that control unit i occurs in the set (was used as a match in the original matching specification). The unit-level variance for protected units is based on unit-level deviations from the estimated MATT:
[S11]
These unit-level variances are then aggregated to calculate the treatment-level (protected) variance:V
[S12]
The final MATT SE estimate is thereforê
Empirical Estimation of MATT We conduct two distinct analyses to estimate the MATT of our mechanisms of interest. First, the mechanisms are considered separately and the procedure outlined in the preceding sections is performed for each mechanism. Second, the mechanisms are considered jointly in the estimation of each MATT via inclusion of all mechanisms in [S4] and [S5]. All results presented in the main text stem from the joint estimation with mechanism bias adjustment (Bias-Adjusted Mechanism Outcomes subsection). We begin by matching protected and unprotected census tracts, using one-to-one Mahalanobis covariate matching with replacement. The resulting matched set [identical to the sample used by Andam et al. (1)] comprises 483 protected and 489 unprotected tracts (six ties during the first-stage matching); the covariate balance is shown in Table S8 . Using postmatch regression bias adjustment, the estimated ATT is −2.39, according to the poverty index. This result indicates that census tracts with at least 10% of their area occupied by a protected area before 1980 had differentially greater levels of poverty reduction Counterfactual Mechanism Values. The counterfactual of interest necessitates estimation of mechanism outcomes for treated units, had protection not affected the mechanism. For each mechanism, estimation of the counterfactual entails a two-step process. First, we estimate a matched unprotected group regression
[S13]
where S i:T=0 and X i:T=0 represent the observed mechanism and baseline covariate values, respectively, of matched unprotected census tracts. The coefficients from [S13] are then used to impute counterfactual mechanism outcomes for each mechanism, ½Ŝ i ð0Þ jT = 1 = X i:T=1β1C ;
[S14]
where X i:T=1 are the observed covariate values of the protected census tracts (empirical analog to Eq. S8). Observed and counterfactual mechanism values for the protected census tracts are shown in Table S2 . The imputed counterfactual mechanism values from [S14] are then used to calculate the counterfactual of interest: the outcomes for protected units, had protection not affected mechanisms ðŶ i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞÞ.
Columns i and ii of Table S2 list the observed and estimated counterfactual mechanism values for the protected census tracts (see Table S9 for estimates of counterfactual mechanism values when bias adjustment is not implemented). The counterfactual for our proxy for tourism is straightforward. Of the 227 census tracts that were impacted by a protected area with a park entrance, none would have a park entrance in the absence of protection. The estimated counterfactual for change in forest cover is significantly different from observed values as well. The average deforestation in protected census tracts between 1960 and 1986 was only 5.76%. We estimate that, had protection not affected deforestation, deforestation would have been ∼16.5% (i.e., the combination of avoided deforestation and additional reforestation between 1960 and 1986 due to the establishment of protected areas was ∼10.8%). Finally, we observe that there was greater infrastructure development (greater reduction in roadless volume) in protected census tracts between 1969 and 1991. However, the counterfactual measures of road networks are not significantly different from observed values.
Single-Mechanism Estimation. In the single-mechanism estimation the following procedure is run on each mechanism of interest independently. We first estimate the influence of covariates and mechanism on outcomes, using the protected census tracts
[S15]
where Y i:T=1 , X i:T=1 , and S i:T=1 are the observed outcomes, matching covariates, and mechanism values for the protected census tracts, respectively. The counterfactual of interest is then estimated by obtaining the fitted values from
[S16] Joint-Mechanism Estimation. In the single-mechanism estimation strategy each mechanism is considered independently. However, the estimated impact (according toβ 2T ) of a particular mechanism may be influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of additional mechanisms in [S15]. By including all of the mechanism variables in [S15] we allow the coefficients for each mechanism to reflect the presence of the other mechanisms. We therefore use the jointmechanism estimation to generate our primary results. We note that because there is little correlation between our mechanism variables (Table S6) , the results from single-and joint-mechanism estimations are nearly identical. For this reason we report only the results from the joint-mechanism analysis in the main text. For clarity we denote the park entrance, change in roadless volume, and forest cover mechanism variables as E, R, and F, respectively. The joint-mechanism estimation analog to [S15] is
where all variables represent the observed values from the protected census tracts. The counterfactual of interest for each mechanism is estimated in a series of three imputations,
where b E i ,R i , andF i represent the imputed mechanism values from [S14] (i.e., ½Ŝ i ð0Þ jT = 1 for the respective mechanisms). Eqs. S18-S20 show that the counterfactual of interest for each mechanism is estimated by substituting the imputed mechanism values (from [S14] for the mechanism of interest) into the respective equation, while leaving the covariates and complementary mechanism values at observed levels. (A function that performs this iterative process was written in R 2.15.1 and is available from the authors upon request.) For instance, the counterfactual of interest for change in roadless volume ðỸ R i:T=1 Þ is calculated by plugging in the imputed counterfactual values for change in roadless volume ðR i Þ into the coefficients from [S17], while leaving covariates ðX i:T=1 Þ and mechanism values for park entrances ðE i Þ and change in forest cover ðF i Þ at the observed levels of protected census tract.
Results for the joint-mechanism estimation strategy are shown in columns v and vi of Table S2 . We find that inclusion of all mechanisms in [S15] does change the estimated influence of each mechanism (compare with column iii of Table S2 ): The coefficient on the park entrance mechanism increases in absolute terms from −2.75 to −3.636 (indicating a relative increase in poverty reduction attributable to tourism), the coefficient on the roadless volume mechanism increases from 0.00098 to 0.0011 (indicating a relative increase in poverty reduction attributable to infrastructure development), and the coefficient on the forest cover mechanism increases from 2.139 to 4.873 (indicating a relative increase in poverty exacerbation attributable to forest cover changes).
Under the joint-mechanism estimation we find that the MATT for the park entrance mechanism increases, in absolute terms, to −1.738. This result implies that tourism associated with the establishment of protected areas accounts for approximately half of the estimated poverty reduction due to protection. Joint estimation also affects the MATT for the deforestation mechanism, which increases to 0.422. In other words, changes in forest cover from the establishment of protected areas have little impact on poverty (not statistically significant). Joint-mechanism estimation has a trivial effect on the MATT of roadless volume, which increases, in absolute terms, to −0.081.
Summary of Primary Identification Strategy
Given the number of specifications and the relative complexity of our econometric strategy, we now offer a descriptive exposition of our primary specification to highlight the intuition underlying the preceding sections. Each of the following subsections represents a stage in our overall strategy to identify the causal mechanism impacts. It is important to recall that the overarching goal of our study is to expand the analysis of Andam et al. (1) (1) we begin our analysis by using matching methods to find comparable census tracts that were never affected by protection for the 493 census tracts that have at least 10% of their area covered by a protected area (established before 1980). We use the same one-to-one Mahalanobis matching as Andam et al. (1) . It is important to note that the fundamental goal of matching is to control for observable differences in pretreatment confounding variables (covariates) by creating a matched set of treated (protected) and control (unprotected) units (census tracts) that have similar distributions across the key covariates (balance). By creating balance across covariates, matching ensures that the remaining variation in outcome is due solely to variation in treatment status. Andam et al. (1) choose the Mahalanobis weighting method because it provides the best balance (compared with alternative specifications) across baseline measures of poverty, agricultural suitability, infrastructure (roadless volume), and forest cover.
Using the matched set, we first estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Estimating the ATT is akin to asking the question, "What would poverty in protected census tracts have been had protected areas not been established?" In our study [and in Andam et al. (1)], estimating the ATT is more appropriate than estimating the average treatment effect (ATE) (which is a weighted average of the ATT and the average treatment effect on the controls, ATC) because there are many census tracts throughout Costa Rica where protected areas would never be established. Therefore, estimating the effect of protection in such areas is inappropriate.
Following Andam et al. (1) we use postmatch regression bias adjustment (12) to calculate the ATT = −2.39. This estimate implies that average poverty index values would have been 2.39 points higher (i.e., greater poverty) in protected census tracts had the protected areas not been established. This translates to an effect size of 0.27, which is moderate.
Estimating the Impact of Protection on Mechanisms. To decompose the ATT into its constituent mechanism effects we first must estimate the impact that protection had on the respective mechanisms: (i) the establishment of a park entrance, (ii) change in roadless volume , and (iii) change in forest cover (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) . Fundamentally, the impact that protection had on each mechanism is quantified by how much the mechanism values changed in protected census tracts due to the establishment of protected areas. Although we observe values for each of the mechanisms in the protected census tracts, we cannot observe what these values would have been had protected areas not been established. We estimate this counterfactual mechanism value for each protected census tract, using the observed mechanism value from the unprotected census tract to which each protected census tract is matched. The underlying assumption (Assumption 2) is that, after matching, the observed mechanism values of the matched unprotected census tracts, on average, represent the mechanism values that the protected census tracts would have experienced, had protected areas not been established. Thus, the difference between the observed mechanism values from the protected census tracts and their matched counterparts represents the causal impact of protected areas on the respective mechanisms (this is the difference between columns i and ii in Table S2 ).
Estimating the Marginal Effect of Mechanisms on Poverty. The previous step tells us how protection affected mechanisms. To complete the causal link between protection and poverty (through the mechanisms) we must understand how the mechanisms affect poverty. We use a regression-based method suggested by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6) to estimate the impact of mechanisms on poverty. We begin by running a regression of poverty on all three mechanisms and all of the covariates used in the matching process, using only the protected census tracts. The key insight from this regression is that it provides the marginal effect of each mechanism on poverty for protected census tracts. In other words, the estimated coefficients on the mechanisms express by how much expected poverty would change in protected census tracts when the value of a mechanism changes by 1. We use these estimated coefficients to estimate what poverty in protected census tracts would have been had protected areas not affected the mechanisms (e.g., had no park entrances been established) by plugging the counterfactual mechanism values (from the previous step) into the estimated coefficients and repeating the process for each mechanism. For example, to estimate what poverty would have been in protected census tracts had protection not affected the establishment of roads, we plug the observed values of covariates, entrances, and change in forest cover back into the estimated coefficients along with the estimated counterfactual values for roadless volume. The fitted values from this process represent the level of poverty that would have been observed in protected census tracts had protection not affected the establishment of roads. This process is repeated for each mechanism.
Estimating the Mechanism Average Treatment Effect on the Treated.
From the previous step we have an estimate of what poverty in protected census tracts would have been in the absence of the respective mechanisms. Thus, each of these estimates contains all of the impacts of protected areas on poverty, net the effects of the mechanism of interest (this is the key counterfactual). Therefore, we can estimate the impact of the mechanism itself by taking the difference between the ATT (which contains all of the impacts of protected areas on poverty) and the key counterfactual (which contains all of the impacts excepting the impact of the mechanism). The resulting difference is attributable to the impact of protected areas on poverty through the mechanism: the MATT. The difference between the ATT and the key counterfactual is calculated for each of the mechanisms to estimate the MATT for each mechanism.
Robustness
Local NATT. The estimation of the MATT and NATT requires the imputation of counterfactual mechanism values that are, by definition, unobserved. Our data provide a unique opportunity to estimate the causal effects of the protection net of tourism under less restrictive assumptions than those used in the main analyses. We exploit the fact that some protected census tracts are observed in the absence of a park entrance mechanism. For this subset of the data S i ð1Þ = S i ð0Þ by definition. In other words, the potential park entrance mechanism value for protected units that did not receive an entrance is the same under protection as it would have been in the absence of protection ðS i ð1Þ = S i ð0Þ = s 0 Þ. Therefore, we can identify this principal stratum ðfS i ð1Þ = S i ð0Þ = s 0 gÞ without invoking Assumption 2. In addition, we observe Y i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞ for this subset of the data and, therefore, do not need Assumption 3 to impute the counterfactual of interest.
The local NATT ðLNATTÞ can be estimated [this framework follows directly from the framework for the LNATE established by Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6) for the subset of data in the principal stratum fS i ð1Þ = S i ð0Þ = s 0 g (6). The fact that we observe protected census tracts that were not affected by a park entrance means that we can take the simple difference in these protected tract outcomes ðY i ð1; S i ð0ÞÞÞ and their matched controls ðY i ð0; S i ð0ÞÞÞ, both of which are observed in the data. We estimate the LNATT for this subgroup to be −0.253. Flores and Flores-Lagunes (6) note that the LNATT represents the local ATT ðLATTÞ for this subgroup because there is no mechanism effect for this group, so Y i ð1; ðS i ð0ÞÞ = Y i ð1Þ. Therefore, under Assumption 1, LNATT = LATT = E½Y i ð1Þ − Y i ð0Þ jX i for this subgroup. We can make comparisons to the MATT estimates, using the estimated LNATT and an additional assumption of constant unit net effects (6): Under this assumption we can define LNATT = NATT and therefore estimate MATT = ATT − LNATT. Using this framework, the estimate of park entrance MATT (−2.14) is close to the estimate from the main analysis (−1.74). We believe that the similarity between the two estimates provides evidence that the assumptions and methods used in the main analyses are providing unbiased estimates of the respective mechanism effects.
Mechanism Analysis Using 1973 Census Tract Boundaries. As noted above, the number of census tracts in Costa Rica has changed over time. We choose to use the 2000 census boundaries because they offer comparability to previous results and greater precision on our mechanism estimates. However, to ensure that our results are not driven by our choice of unit boundary, we run all mechanism analyses using the 1973 census boundaries to define the unit of observation. The results from these analyses are shown in Table S3 .
The results are very similar under this alternative unit specification (Table S3 , column vi). Of the 249 protected census tracts, 135 were affected by a park with an entrance and the MATT on the tourism mechanism accounts for a similar proportion (compared with the primary analysis in Table S2 , column vi) of the ATT (MATT = −0:723, ATT = −1:27). The results for the infrastructure mechanism are also similar to our primary analysis: Although increased road networks have poverty-alleviating effects, protected areas did not induce enough road development for this mechanism to play a significant role. The MATT estimate for change in forest cover is proportionately smaller than in the primary analysis but remains insignificant.
The results from the 1973 analysis are consistent with those from our primary analysis and provide further evidence that our estimates are not highly sensitive to specification.
Alternative Mechanism Estimation Strategies. The linear structural estimation model (LSEM) proposed by Baron and Kenny (15) has been a workhorse for estimating causal mechanism (mediation) effects in the political science literature. The method uses the results from multiple linear regressions to estimate direct (net) and indirect (mechanism) effects. We estimate the impacts of tourism, infrastructure, and forest cover change, using the LSEM to ensure that our results are not driven by our choice of estimation strategy.
Mechanism effect estimates from the LSEM stem from the results of three separate linear regressions,
[S22]
where Y i , T i , and S i represent the observed values of poverty index in 2000, protection, and mechanism, respectively. β 1 from [S22] represents to the total effect (akin to the ATT), β 2 represents the effect of treatment on the mechanism (the initial causal pathway in Fig. 1B of the main text), and β 3 represents the impact of the mechanism on poverty (the second causal pathway in Fig. 1B of the main text). Baron and Kenny (15) suggest that the indirect effect (mechanism effect) is equal to ðβ 2 · β 3 Þ. Unbiased estimates from the LSEM framework rely on the same assumptions described above: that outcomes and mechanisms are independent of treatment conditional on covariates. Therefore, we implement the same first-stage matching as described above before running the regressions, and we add all covariates to Eqs. S23 and S24.
The results from the LSEM estimation are shown in Table S4 , and we use the Mediation package (16) in R 2.15.1 to estimate P values. The total effect is estimated to be −1.7, which represents the ATT absent regression bias adjustment. The effects of each mechanism are made by recalculating Eqs. S23 and S24 for each mechanism, independently. The results from the LSEM estimation are quite similar to our primary results. Tourism that is associated with the establishment of protected areas remains the largest contributor to the reductions in poverty. Infrastructure development, again, does not have a significant impact on poverty. The point estimate on the change in forest cover mechanism is roughly similar to that of our primary results (0.53 compared with 0.42); however, according to the SE estimator suggested by Imai et al. (17) , the LSEM estimate is highly significant ðP < 0:01Þ. In all LSEM mechanism estimates the SEs are much smaller than those from the primary analysis.
We believe that the similarities between the estimates from our primary analysis and those from the LSEM provide further evidence that our results are not sensitive to our estimation strategy. Further, our precision estimates are comparatively more conservative, meaning that we are less likely to draw unfounded inference from our results.
Sensitivity Analysis Using LSEM. Assumptions 1 and 2 [similar to sequential ignorability by Imai et al. (17) ] are required for identification of mechanism effects, but like any other assumption on ignorability they are untestable. However, Rosenbaum (18) suggested a method for testing the sensitivity of average treatment effect estimates to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., violations of ignorability. Essentially, so-called Rosenbaum bounds estimate how strong an omitted confounder would have to be to prevent rejection of the null hypothesis of zero treatment effect.
Imai et al. (17) suggest sensitivity analysis under the LSEM framework in the spirit of the Rosenbaum bounds. Imai et al. (17) note that Assumptions 1 and 2 imply independence of the LSEM regressions. Therefore, e 2 should not be correlated with e 3 . The logic of Imai et al.'s (17) sensitivity test asks how much correlation between e 2 and e 3 (e.g., the importance of an omitted confounder) would be necessary to negate statistically significant mechanism effect estimates. The analysis imposes correlation in the error terms measured by the term ρ, where −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Results that are negated at large values of ρ are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, whereas results that are negated at small values of ρ are not. We use the Mediation package to perform the sensitivity analysis suggested by Imai et al. (17) .
Given the estimates from the LSEM approach were similar to our primary estimates, we believe this sensitivity analysis is informative. The analysis implies that the conclusion that tourism from protected area creation contributed to poverty reductions would be maintained unless an unobservable confounder had a negative correlation with expected poverty and where the government places park entrances of −0.21 or more negative.
The ρs on the tourism and change in forest cover mechanisms (last column of Table S4 ) are −0.21 and 0.27. We interpret these parameters as indicating that the estimated mechanism effects are moderately sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity. However, it should be noted that any measure on the sensitivity of an estimate to unobserved heterogeneity in no way implies the presence of heterogeneity. 
